



Institutional Biosafety Committee Meeting Minutes

Meeting Date: February 24, 2026

Location: Microsoft Teams

In Attendance:

| Committee Members in Attendance: | | |
|---|--|--|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Hyatt Green | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Geoff Holm | |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Brian Leydet | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Emily Ledgerwood | |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Andrew Newhouse | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paul Massa | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Peter Vandemark | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Shannon Richter | |
| Also in Attendance: | | |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tiffany Castor | | |

Called to order at 1:00pm

Old Business: NA

New Business:

1. Application Review

a. Application 2026-01

- i. Overview: The Applicant appears to have limited experience in biosafety. They would collect roughly 500 wolf scat samples from WA and ship them to ESF. Literature shows storage of wolf scat samples at -80C can kill echinococcus eggs, but samples still may contain various pathogens, including Echinococcus multilocularis, Giardia, Cryptosporidium, Toxocara canis, Various bacterial pathogens (Salmonella, Campylobacter, E. coli)
- ii. Application Comments:
 1. low overall risk (i.e., low, but non-zero, probability of pathogen presence);
 2. need to register non-ESF personnel with HR
 3. uncertainty regarding USDA APHIS requirements and the need to consult USDA for clarification. Because wolves prey on cervids, the work may fall outside 1102 exemption, raising questions about import into the US.
 4. The import certificate references bear scat, which does not align with the IBC protocol.
 5. Parvovirus and Chronic Wasting Disease were identified as a pathogen of concern in addition to others.
 6. Clarification of biosafety levels is needed. BSL-2 may be excessive; the committee discussed whether the work could be conducted more practically on campus with appropriate safeguards and unified guidance.
 7. The manual references Longmire buffer, which includes sodium azide; mixing sodium azide with bleach can generate toxic gas. How will that risk be mitigated?
 8. Another member supported classifying the work as BSL-2 due to potential bacterial pathogens. The proposal lacks clarity on ensuring samples are fresh and does not clearly describe field procedures, raising concerns.
 9. CDC BMBL guidance allows some BSL-2 work outside a biosafety cabinet if risks are effectively mitigated. The committee discussed next steps for reviewing applications like this.

10. PI needs more guidance on the IBC process as well as biosafety procedures.
 - iii. Recommendations from the Committee:
 1. Biosafety cabinets exist on campus but rely on other researchers willingness to allow wolf scat in their spaces risks contamination other health risks.
 2. Samples can be neutralized with guanidine/organic lysis buffers to make handling safer. His primary goal is simply DNA extraction, but there may be other analytes.
 3. Member agrees the work can be performed at BSL-1, though BSL-2 is the safer recommendation. Once the sample is treated with a GITC-based lysis buffer, it becomes effectively disinfected and safe to handle.
 4. DNA extraction and analysis are the final objectives. There are inconsistencies throughout, indicating a need for additional guidance. We should request a clearer summary of his intended workflow so we can provide project-specific recommendations. Is there a formal proposal? There's a strong existing relationship with the Indigenous group involved.
 5. Chronic wasting disease and spillover risks highlight the need to review and critique current standards to ensure no corners are being cut. The goal is to educate, reinforce proper practices, and protect the College.
 6. Their signage system doesn't match our previous standards. Hazard signs should be submitted through the EHS website using the standard form. This has been communicated to the applicant.
 - iv. Discussion of procedure
 1. Concern: Do we have a deadline to meet and review this? When is research expected to start?
 2. Committee agreed to not vote on approval, but send back to PI with comments and guidance.
 - v. **Action item:** Draft an email with consolidated feedback. Let applicant know applicant is expected to revise the proposal, application, and manual, and that the updated materials will be circulated to the committee—unless the group decides this step isn't necessary. Approval or disapproval over email likely.
2. Minor Updates to IBC Policy & Procedures Manual
 - a. Section 4.1.8
 - i. Changing the term, "basic" to "general" 4.1.8
 - ii. "If work involves recombinant DNA" – highlighted in red
 - b. Anticipated changes to NIH biosafety policy: The listening sessions are meant to synthesize all the feedback gathered on federal biosafety policies. It's still unclear how the NIH guidelines may change, but those updates will directly shape all IBC requirements and practices.
 - c. Section 4.2.4.4
 - i. New section on proper disposal of materials at the conclusion of a project.
 - ii. Investigators shouldn't leave materials behind, and a formal policy may be warranted. A defined decontamination or destruction procedure should be part of our safety protocols.
 - iii. Consider adding guidance on communication, what happens if someone leaves abruptly? What is the process, and where is it documented? This should be included in the manual under waste management, and department chairs should incorporate it into off-boarding procedures
 - iv. **Action item:** Determine disposal process assuming PI is gone.
 - d. Section 7: Lab Safety Training:
 - i. This description is more accurate
 - ii. Include a brief overview of relevant NIH guidelines. Training duration should align with the standard CITI timeframe of approximately 30–45 minutes.
 3. Vote on the proposed minor changes to IBC procedure and policy document – **Approved unanimously.**

Adjournment 1:45PM