

National Governance
and the Global Climate
Change Regime

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In memory of Morita-Sensei (1950–2003)

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NOTES

This chapter builds on Dana R. Fisher and William R. Freudenburg, “Post-industrialization and Environmental Quality: An Empirical Analysis of the Environmental State,” *Social Forces* (forthcoming).

1. See also Roberts and Grimes (1997), Roberts (2001).
2. See www.iaea.org/about/index.htm for more information (accessed October 1, 2003).
3. See, for example, Daly, Cobb, and Cobb (1989); for a written assessment in the popular media, see Cobb, Halstead, and Rowe (1995).
4. For details on TPES calculations, see www.iaea.org/statist/keyworld/keystats.htm (accessed October 1, 2003).
5. Available at www.unep-wcmc.org/protected_areas/data/un_annex.htm (accessed October 1, 2003).
6. See www.yale.edu/envirocenter/research/esl.html (accessed October 1, 2003).
7. See www.ciesin.columbia.edu/indicators/ESI/ESI_01a.pdf (accessed October 1, 2003).
8. Although it is conceivable that the results of this analysis might be biased by the inclusion of the United States, the results remain the same when the U.S. case is removed and the adjusted R-squared decreases to .620.
9. In 1998, the European Union emitted 3,170.5 million tonnes of carbon dioxide, compared to 5,409.8 for the United States (IEA 2001).
10. Grammatical errors were edited from the responses of nonnative English speakers for clarity.

4



State-Led Collaboration in Japan

As a first step in looking more closely at the dynamics of climate change regime formation within countries, we now turn to the case of Japan. To understand the formation of the Japanese climate change regime since the Kyoto Protocol was drafted in 1997, it is important to recognize some of the unique characteristics of the country. Behind all of its domestic and international policy decisions is the Japanese culture itself (for a full review of Japanese culture, see Josai Daigaku 1986; see also, Smith 1983; van Wolfrren 1989). Perhaps the most remarkable characteristic of Japanese culture is what the Japanese call *wa*, a notion that is rooted in Confucian and Buddhist thought and emphasizes the “overriding importance of social harmony” within Japanese society (Smith 1983, 49). Even with the continuing evolution of Japanese culture, *wa* continues to be a main tenet.

This inherent theme of social harmony is one of the reasons that the Japanese government has remained under a single party’s control for so long. Although Japan has had eight prime ministers in the last ten years, the same political party—the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)—has maintained a majority in the Diet, the Japanese parliament, almost exclusively since 1955. Even during the one brief period of exception, when the LDP lost its majority in 1993, the political party continued to maintain a high level of power within the Diet by joining in coalitions with other parties. In 2001, for example, the party controlled over 45 percent of both houses

of the Diet. The power of the LDP also extends to the prime minister, as the Diet is responsible for selecting the head of the state. In addition, half of the members of the Japanese cabinet, who are appointed by the prime minister, are legally mandated to be members of the Diet. With the LDP maintaining a majority in the Japanese parliament, and thus playing a leading role in determining the prime minister, members of the LDP usually sit in the cabinet. In other words, this one political party continues to wield significant power in Japan.

Another reason for the stability of the Japanese government is the strongly collaborative relationship between the Japanese state and market. In fact, this collaboration contributed to Japan's quick economic recovery after World War II. In the words of Huddle and Reich, "A powerful partnership for central government and private industry . . . concentrated its full efforts on rapid industrial growth" (1975, 26). The partnership was so successful, up until the 1990s, that Japan's economy boomed, growing at rates that Westerners found remarkable (see, e.g., Stone 1969; Forsberg 2000; Grimes 2001).

One of the by-products of this economic growth, however, was the kind of environmental degradation that would have been predicted by the environmental sociology writers whose work was summarized in chapter 1. Perhaps the most vivid consequences of this environmental damage involved the occurrence of pollution diseases throughout the country. In the 1950s and 1960s, thousands of Japanese suffered diseases caused by environmental degradation and pollution. In fact, by the 1970s almost half of the Japanese population thought that they were suffering from a pollution-related disease (for a complete discussion, see Huddle and Reich 1975; McKean 1981).

Although the state and the economic sector were slow to respond, their eventual reactions appear to have been more similar to what would have been predicted by the environmental state theorists. The methods through which citizens voiced their grievances, and the subsequent state and market responses that followed, are consistent with the mechanisms outlined in the theory of reflexive modernization¹ (see, e.g., Beck 1987, 1995, 1997, 1999; Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994; see also, Offe 1996). In essence, the Japanese government responded to massive citizen demonstrations by passing sweeping regulations to protect the environment in 1970.

Today, evidence increasingly suggests that Japan's leaders no longer see economic growth as being antithetical to environmental protection. As early as 1981, McKean reported that Japan had the strictest pollution regulations in the world, spending more of its gross national product (GNP) on antipollution measures than any other country. This trend has continued; as noted in an article in *The Economist*, for example, Japanese manufacturers embraced the ISO 14,000 standard of environmental good housekeep-

ing² "faster than any other country" ("Toxic Waste in Japan" 1998, 60; see also Hideaki 1999). Moreover, in accordance with the expectations of the environmental state literatures discussed in chapter 1, environmental quality in Japan has appeared to improve with economic growth, even with the country's recent economic troubles. In the words of Mitsuda, "the very success of [Japanese] economic growth, the so-called 'economic miracle,' has encouraged the establishment and strengthening of environmentalism in the process of Japanese modernization" (1997, 442).

Despite its general support of environmental issues, the Japanese government was much slower to adopt measures to deal with global climate change. Prior to COP-3, the Japanese did not seem particularly supportive of international climate change regulation that relied on domestic reductions. In 1994, for example, the Japanese government reported to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that it believed that "joint implementation [the opportunity for a country to account for some of its emission reductions inside another] should not be restricted to Annex I parties, but should also be allowed to take place between Annex I and other Parties of the Convention" (International Energy Agency 1994, 107–8). In other words, rather than focus on domestic emission reductions, Japan preferred to focus its early climate change policies in other countries. In fact, throughout the negotiation process since 1994, Japan has maintained its position that carbon sinks and other overseas mechanisms—the framework for which were only finalized after the COP-6bis negotiations—would account for much of its emission reduction commitment.

As late as 1997, Japan remained an active member of an alliance with the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. This umbrella group, called JUSCANZ, coordinated its negotiating because "these were the developed countries with reasons to want to slow down the European Union. . . . Japan was wholly dependent on imported oil and coal, and already far less energy-intensive than other developed countries" (Leggett 1999, 249). As a result of these factors, Japan, working with the other members of JUSCANZ, pushed for the inclusion of developing country participation in a climate change treaty. Even with their attempts, however, the parties to the Kyoto Protocol finally agreed that the climate change treaty should follow the Framework Convention on Climate Change in its commitments. In other words, these parties ultimately agreed with the Berlin Mandate, which came out of COP-1, in 1995. It had stated that only the "Annex I," or developed, countries would be bound by the first commitment period of the protocol, which was eventually written in 1997 (for a full discussion of the climate change negotiations leading up to 1997, see Gelsbans 1997; Leggett 1999; Paterson 1996; see also, Bodansky 2001).

Although the JUSCANZ umbrella group has continued to maintain a relatively consistent negotiating block throughout the negotiations, there have been cracks in the consensus. One particularly significant difference took place during the COP-2 negotiations, in Geneva, when the United States shifted its position away from the other members of the JUSCANZ block (for a full discussion of the United States' changing position at the climate change negotiations during this period, see Leggett 1999). After the other members of the umbrella group tried to block the change in the U.S. position without success, Japan went along and agreed to the Geneva Declaration, which pushed the parties to work for a legally binding protocol at the next round of negotiations, in Kyoto. As discussed in further detail in chapter 6, this change in the JUSCANZ position was quite significant to the formation of an international climate change regime, and the effects of this decision can still be seen today.

Partially as a result of the specifications of the Berlin Mandate and the United States' leading JUSCANZ members to support the Geneva Declaration, Japan, the host of the COP-3 negotiations, changed its position on climate change. In the words of Taka Hiraiishi, a Japanese national who cochairs the National Greenhouse Gas Inventories Task Force Bureau of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), "Japan did not favor a big reduction before Kyoto. Now, Japan believes that there is a need for a big reduction" (interview, 1999). Some people say that the change in Japan's position was also a response to the European Union's pressure regarding emission reductions. Going into the COP-3 negotiations, the EU supported the Kyoto Protocol, requiring a 15 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions below 1990 levels. In the words of Yasuyoshi Tanaka, the environment writer for the third largest newspaper in Japan,³ the *Mainichi Shinbun*: "If it were not for the EU decision, the Japanese would not have agreed. International pressure played a role. The Japanese are weak to international pressure. . . . Because the EU was pushing for more [emission reductions], Japan changed its position" (interview, 2000).

International pressure has played a role in many decisions regarding Japan's position on climate change. Consistent with the global environmental system, this interrelation between the domestic and international sides of the process of climate change regime formation has significantly contributed to political outcomes both inside Japan and in the larger global context. In addition to the change in the JUSCANZ position and the international pressure from the EU, Japan was particularly committed to the outcome of the Kyoto Protocol, as it was the host country for the very conference that officially drafted the protocol: the Kyoto Protocol itself even holds the name of one of the most sacred cities in Japan.

Although some international environmental groups have accused Japan of being one of the countries that is trying to do everything it can to

wreck the treaty, Japan's commitment to the mitigation of climate change appears to be genuine. Since the official drafting of the Kyoto Protocol, in December 1997, Japan has been actively promoting the regulation of climate change, and the Japanese government has passed legislation in response to the protocol. The first step in the establishment of a climate change regime in Japan was the "Law Concerning the Promotion of the Measures to Cope with Global Warming" (law number 117), which was passed in 1998. The law "aims to promote the measures to cope with global warming through e.g. defining the responsibilities of the central government, local governments, businesses and citizens to take measures to cope with global warming, and establishing a basic policy on measures to cope with global warming, and thereby contribute to ensuring healthful and cultural lives of present and future generations of people, and to contribute to the welfare of all human beings" (Environment Agency of Japan 1998, 1). Beyond this preliminary legislation, the Japanese government has debated a number of specific measures to achieve its 6 percent reductions. As mentioned, Japan has planned to account for 5.5 percent of its reductions below the 1990 level through growing forests—otherwise known as carbon sinks—and other actions outside its borders, using what are called the "Kyoto Mechanisms." This lack of significant domestic emission reductions in the Japanese climate change plan has led activists from around the world to criticize the Japanese position. Commenting on this scenario, and others throughout the chapter, is Shuzo Nishioka, the executive director of the Japanese National Institute for Environmental Studies; a professor of media and governance at Keio University; and the project leader of the climate change group at the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES), one of the leading Japanese think tanks working on climate change. Nishioka points out that, once the protocol is ratified in Japan, domestic actions will be taken.

In addition, even though Japan intends to meet the 6 percent reduction below its 1990 levels predominantly through nondomestic measures, it has been one of the more successful countries in stabilizing domestic emissions since 1997. Emission levels in Japan have supported Leggett's statement (1999) that Japan is one of the most efficient of the developed countries. Even before the Kyoto Protocol was drafted, per capita CO₂ emissions in Japan were less than half as high as in the top emitter in the world, the United States ("Global Warming Update" 1996). According to World Resources Institute calculations (1994, 208), Japan's total greenhouse gas emissions in 1990 were only a quarter as high as those of the United States. Even with its high levels of efficiency, however, emissions in Japan have still grown since 1990. As of 1998, Japan had increased its overall CO₂ emissions to 7.6 percent above 1990 levels (IEA 2000b). Table 4.1 provides both overall and per capita comparative emissions data for

Table 4.1. Overall Emissions and per Capita Emissions of Carbon Dioxide for Selected Nations (in million tons of CO₂)

	Japan	Netherlands	United States
Overall emissions, 1990	1,048.5	156.8	4,843.8
Overall emissions, 1998	1,128.3	171.4	5,409.8
Change (%)	7.6	9.3	11.7
Per capita emissions, 1990	8.4	10.2	18.6
Per capita emissions, 1998	9.0	11.1	20.8
Change (sum)	0.6	0.9	2.2

Source: International Energy Agency (2000b)

Japan, the United States, and the Netherlands, since 1990. As can be seen, although Japan's emissions have increased since 1990, it has the lowest level of growth of the three countries.⁴ Perhaps of more interest, however, is the data on the per capita level. Since 1990, Japan's per capita CO₂ emissions have increased only by 0.6 million tons carbon dioxide per capita.⁵ As discussed later, at least part of these emission reductions are attributable to the severe economic recession that hit Japan in the early 1990s.

This chapter follows Japan's responses to the Kyoto Protocol leading up to the COP-6bis, in July 2001 in Bonn, Germany. It begins with the signing of the protocol in 1997, looking at the various social actors involved. Consistent with the Japanese notion of *wa*, the Japanese case presents an example of a strong state working closely with scientists and a collaborative market sector to bring about positive policy outcomes. This chapter concludes with a summary of Japan's position on the Kyoto Protocol at the time of the COP-6bis negotiations, in July 2001.

RESULTS: POST-KYOTO STATUS

Science

In contrast to the United States, where the issue of the validity of the science has long been at the center of the climate change debate, the science of climate change has been basically accepted in Japan. Of all of the people whom I interviewed in Japan, not one person challenged the validity of the science of climate change. Instead, there was just one skeptical response to the issue, by Kimiko Hirata, a leader of the Kiko ("Climate") Network, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) that coordinates environmental groups working on climate change; however, the organization scarcely endorses the skepticism: "Most of the people believe that climate change is happening. Of course there are the skeptics on this issue, but

they do not have an impact" (interview, Hirata 1999). In general, as can be summed up in the words of Nishioka, "There is no real opposition to the 'scientific view' here in Japan. There is no suspicion about science. It is accepted" (interview, 1999).

Hirashi, however, presented a viewpoint that was only slightly different: "The focus is on the political and negotiation even though more discussion of the scientific argument is needed" (interview, Hirashi 1999). Although scientists in Japan acknowledge that there are uncertainties regarding the science of climate change, they tend to agree that, in the words of Tsuneyuki Morita—the head of the social and environmental systems division at the National Institute of Environmental Studies, a coordinating lead author for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) *Third Assessment Report for Working Group III*, and an economics professor at the Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology at the Tokyo Institute of Technology—"At this moment, scientific knowledge is at a very, very low level about the climate. We need a lot more time but we cannot wait. . . . Policy should be promoted simultaneously" (interview, 1999). In other words, Morita supports Japan's following through with the precautionary principle (outlined in chapter 2).

To some degree, due to the role that academics play in policy making in Japan, the science and the politics of the issue have become conflated. Many of the scientists whom I interviewed hold positions as academics and within of political agencies. One such example can be seen in the case of Yoichi Kaya, a professor of the graduate school at Keio University. In addition to holding an academic position, Kaya is the chair of two energy-related committees for the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI); he is also the vice chair of the integrated council of the government that coordinates policy strategy development on global environmental issues. In his own words, "I have been connected quite closely to the government, but still, I am a scientist" (interview, 1999). Similarly, Morita sees himself as an "interface between policy making and science. . . . a go-between who interprets the line between science and policy" (interview, 1999). In other words, Morita identifies himself as bridging the science-policy continuum. Simply put, these scientists are not unique in their affiliations. "Many members of the Central Environment Council and the joint panel are at the same time members of MITI's advisory councils" (Ouchi 1998, 26).

In sum, science plays a central role in policy making in Japan—so much so that scientists actually hold positions on government councils. The scientists working within Japanese academia are the same people who are leading the national labs to conduct research on climate change, and in many cases, they are the leaders of the governmental committees that are deciding national climate change policies. These close relationships

between science and policy have significant implications on the efficacy of environmental policy in Japan; at a minimum, because leading scientists are linked with the government, scientific findings are easily diffused to policymakers.⁶

The State

This connection between science and policy needs to be kept in mind as we turn to the role that the Japanese state has played in dealing with the issue of climate change. Not only are the people involved in Japanese policy making often the same as those working on the science of climate change, but actors within the state in Japan see the relationship between the issue's science and policy as inherently related. In the words of Kazuo Matsushita, an ex-member of the Environment Ministry⁷ who now serves as the acting vice president of the government-funded Japanese think tank the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES), the goal of this type of work is to "translate these global environmental issues into domestic policies" (interview, 1999).

In general, the Japanese government is perceived as being very strong and thus responsible for taking the lead in the issue of climate change. As Harumi Suda, a leader of the consumer and environmental movement in Japan and the director of the Shimin Undo ("National Citizen's Movement") Center states, "Because the government is strong, if the government does not lead, lifestyles cannot change" (interview, 1999). Although the basic expectation in Japan is that the government is responsible for dealing with environmental issues such as climate change, Morita points out that "the government cannot do much about what people think, and they are very critical" (interview, 1999).

Perhaps partly because of the belief that citizen lifestyles may not easily change as a result of governmental policy, climate change mitigation in Japan is based on a top-down approach that relies heavily on government action. In the words of Akiko Domoto, a former member of the Japanese Diet who became the mayor of Chiba prefecture in 2001, "Implementation of numerical targets is a priority" (interview, 1999). This opinion is echoed in similar statements by Japanese bureaucrats, such as Hironori Hamanaka, the director general of the Global Environment Department of the Environment Ministry and one of the heads of the Japanese climate change negotiating team: "The goal is, of course, to implement our own policy effectively . . . and to reduce our emissions of greenhouse gases" (interview, 1999).

Although the Environment Ministry is responsible for dealing with and regulating environmental issues in Japan, MITI is responsible for energy policy. As such, MITI is responsible for instituting the measures that deal

with global climate change. This distinction between the regulating bodies in Japan leads some outsiders, such as Suda, to claim that "because the different governmental agencies are fighting against each other, it is hard to get things accomplished" (interview, 1999). Still, even though some level of infighting between the agencies may very well be taking place, the notion of harmony and *wa* generally prevails. For example, Morita insists that "they both agree that something should be done" about global climate change (interview, Morita 1999).

On June 19, 1998, the Global Warming Prevention Headquarters of the Japanese government, which includes cabinet members and the Japanese prime minister himself, published the *Guideline of Measures to Prevent Global Warming: Measures towards 2010 to Prevent Global Warming*. The guideline reports the measures that the government plans to take to achieve the 6 percent emission reductions stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol. In essence, the government plans to "strengthen efforts which can attract the participation and cooperation of every social actor, mobilize every possible policy measure, and promote comprehensive actions in a systematic way in order to steadfastly achieve the reductions" (Global Warming Prevention Headquarters 1998, 1). The report continues by pointing out the government's main goals of achieving a 2.5 percent reduction in domestic emissions by "promoting measures relating to both energy supply and demand focusing on promoting energy saving, introduction of new energy and the construction of nuclear power plants" (2). As a means of providing a cleaner energy source to support Japanese economic growth, the Japanese government's global climate change reduction plan included "an energy supply forecast with 20 additional nuclear reactors as its centerpiece" (Ouchi 1998, 25).

When dealing with energy policy, one of MITI's main concerns is energy security. As an International Energy Agency report points out, "Japan's limited indigenous resources translate into high dependence on energy imports. . . . Security of energy supply is a policy priority, since energy demand is expected to rise as a stimulus to economic growth" (1994, 110). This priority relates directly to the fact that the central aspect of the Japanese government's response is the construction of new nuclear power plants. Given the lack of any indigenous energy options in Japan, the government has chosen to invest in a domestic energy option that is considered clean in terms of greenhouse gas emissions. Hiraishi justifies the Japanese government's decision: "Is the 6 percent reduction feasible? Without nuclear power it is not possible" (interview, Hiraishi 1999).

Despite the notion of *wa*, however, this plan to increase the number of nuclear plants in Japan has been criticized by many sectors of society. Particularly in the aftermath of the nuclear accident that took place at the Tokaimura power plant in September 1999, many Japanese have been less

supportive of nuclear energy in Japan.⁸ In addition, the decision to build these nuclear plants was based on models that predicted energy consumption extrapolated from the Japanese economy of the early 1990s. As a result of the decreased economic growth in Japan—or, as many Japanese would say, since the “bubble burst”—energy consumption has slightly decreased.⁹ With the stabilization of energy consumption, advisors to MITI, such as Kaya, have pointed out that “the environmental target [of the Kyoto Protocol] will be realized . . . because of the reduction in economic growth” (interview, 1999). In 2000, the largest English-language newspaper in Japan, the *Japan Times*, reported emission reductions that substantiate Kaya’s prediction. “Environment Ministry officials say the decline in emissions is due largely to a drop in the industrial sector, attributing the reduction in part to economic stagnation” (“Greenhouse Gas Output Declines” 2000, A6).

Concurrent with new energy policies being coordinated by MITI, the Environment Ministry designed and implemented the Law Concerning the Promotion of the Measures to Cope with Global Warming. This law involves a nationwide inventory of greenhouse gas emissions, conducted on the local level. This plan also, in the words of Hamanaka, “requires national government and all local authorities, local government and also 3,200 cities, towns and villages . . . to draw up their own plans . . . to reduce greenhouse gases” (interview, 1999). In addition to the inventories and plans, the law creates a national center for climate change that will work with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and citizens.

The law has been criticized by members of NGOs—such as Naoyuki Hata of the Citizen’s Forum, who states that it is “weak” (interview, 1999)—because these steps are only preliminary and do not go far enough to meet Japan’s emission reduction targets set in the Kyoto Protocol. Others, such as Yasuko Kameyama,¹⁰ a climate change researcher at the National Institute of Environmental Studies, see it as “the starting point . . . [to help us know] from where emissions come” (interview, 1999). Furthermore, the Japanese government has been debating other measures. In an interview at the climate change negotiations in The Hague, in November 2000, Hamanaka outlined a number of climate change mitigation measures that are being considered by the government for implementation after the protocol is finalized and ratified by the Japanese government. These measures include the possible amendment of the energy conservation law to include emissions trading, as well as the possible introduction of a “green tax” that would apply to consumers and small businesses. The Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, in fact, held a forum in November 2000 to review Japanese climate change mitigation policy options, including those mentioned by Hamanaka (IGES 2000). However, Hamanaka also stated, in an interview in November 2000, that in the end

the implementation of some or all of these measures is “based on the outcome of the [COP-6] conference,” which would not be known until after the COP-6bis meeting, in July 2001.

Until then, the Japanese government was maintaining its limited energy policy and local projects that addressed the issue of climate change until the outcome of the negotiations were known. Japanese and international NGOs continue to criticize the Japanese position for being too timid, and the Japanese government for “just waiting until after ratification” (interview, Hirata 2000). Nevertheless, the Japanese government has taken preliminary steps to consider how it will meet its commitment and has actually reduced emissions since 1997, while other countries have not.

Industry

Given Japan’s strong state, it is not a surprise that Japanese society is also well known for its close ties between the state and the industrial sectors (for a full discussion, see van Wolfrén 1989). The state tends to work closely with industry, which in turn collaborates to determine how to implement necessary regulations. A report about the Japanese government’s Central Environment Council, which advises the government on issues such as global climate change, says that “the reality on the council level is one of close cooperation between the Environment Ministry, MITI, and business” (Ouchi 1998, 26). The regulation of climate change in Japan is a case in point in that the government has only taken steps that are approved by industry. Hirata stresses this point, saying that “there is always the government choosing industry” (interview, 1999). In other words, NGOs are critical of the fact that the state is sensitive to Japanese industry and that, when given a choice between industry’s desires and the environment, the environment tends to lose.

Although the Japanese government has committed itself to implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and has even passed a preliminary law as the first step in regulating climate change, it has avoided imposing regulations on industry. Hamanaka describes the process of environmental law-making in Japan and the present climate change law:

In our country, the industries themselves accept their own action plans with their goals. . . . We thought it would be premature to impose legal requirements for emission reductions, so basically this law just promotes voluntary actions to establish plans for reduction of greenhouse gases. . . . This is just a voluntary action . . . [for] industry. They are not legally required to achieve the goal. (interview, 1999)

As this high-ranking governmental official points out, the Japanese government is trying to provide industry with a guide to its priorities. The

Japanese government considers voluntary commitments from industry “major policy measures to be applied” (Akio Morishima, head of the Central Environment Council, as quoted in Corliss 2000, A9). In other words, the government uses voluntary laws, such as the Law Concerning the Promotion of the Measures to Cope with Global Warming, to warn industry that it needs to come up with a plan to deal with environmental issues such as climate change.

Still, unlike what might be expected by critical or skeptical analysts who see these types of voluntary measures as merely symbolic actions by the state (see, e.g., Edelman 1964), the Japanese government’s warning seems to be taken to heart by Japanese industries. Nishioka states that industry focuses on these “top-down approaches” (interview, 1999). At the same time, both government and industry are interested in reducing energy consumption for an altogether different reason: Japan has a very small indigenous supply of fuel.

All in all, the strategy of the government’s warning industries about its priorities seems to have been reasonably effective in promoting voluntary agreements in industries. Nippon Steel, for example, voluntarily committed to decreasing its energy consumption. In the words of Teruo Okazaki, the senior manager of the global environmental affairs department of Nippon Steel Corporation, “the energy savings in our production line is one of the most important things for us. . . . Our target is 10 percent for energy savings so from 1992 to 2010, 10 percent of our total amount of energy consumed will be saved” (interview, 1999). Similarly, Hajime Ohta, the executive counselor of Environment, Energy and International Economic Affairs of the Keidanren (“Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations”), which is responsible for 60 to 80 percent of the country’s gross national product, says that the “business sector is responsible for 40 percent of Japan’s carbon dioxide emissions. They will do what they promised” (interview, 1999). Even though these are voluntary measures, many actors in industry do not feel that they have a choice. Ohta goes on to say that the Keidanren recognizes that if its member companies “did not do it on their own, the government would regulate them” (interview, 1999). In a related editorial, Ohta points out that through the increased pressures for voluntary agreements, “the government is effectively tightening its control over corporate activities” (Ohta 1998).

Even with these pledges, some NGOs have criticized the voluntary measures. In the words of Yurika Ayukawa, the climate change campaign officer for the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Japan, “There is no place for a third-party evaluation or verification team. . . . They will say they will do this and I think they will do it, but who knows?” (interview, 1999). Even while she complains about the evaluation of these agreements, there is a sense that these agreements are effective and that

industry will achieve its goals. The director general of the Japanese Environment Ministry is even more certain of industry’s commitments to climate change: “They are, all of them, well-known companies, and they already made their plans public. I think that the CEOs are under heavy pressure if they fail to achieve that goal. . . . I think the likelihood or the possibility for them [the companies] to reach their own target would be . . . large” (interview, Hamanaka 1999). This behavior is consistent with other aspects of Japanese culture in that harmony (or *wa*) and saving face are central components of social interaction in Japan (e.g., van Wolfren 1989; Smith 1983). Positive environmental outcomes of these agreements can already be seen in the Keidanren report that shows a 9.5 percent decrease in the emissions of Japan Iron and Steel Federation and the 9.7 percent decrease in the emissions of the Cement Association of Japan between the years 1990 and 1998.¹¹

In response to such tangible evidence of receptiveness, there is an overall approval of the role that industry is playing in dealing with climate change in Japan. In particular, Japanese industry has been lauded as being exceptionally efficient. Some have even called Japan “the most energy efficient country of the OECD” (interview, Ohta 1999; see also Leggett 1999). The big criticism of Japanese companies comes not from their efficiency standards and ability to implement commitments to such standards but from their ever-increasing production and the growing pressure for consumer consumption. Again, NGOs criticize Japanese industry. For example, Ayukawa provides a very different criticism here, stating that companies “will reduce their energy consumption. They will make their products more energy-efficient, but they will make more. That is what they are saying. And that is what the projection is: we will be using more computers, more phones. . . . and we will be using more energy in 2010” (interview, 1999). Even with this criticism, Japanese industry, by initiating its own voluntary measures, is working with the government to respond proactively to the issue of climate change using a top-down approach.

At the first part of the COP-6 climate change negotiations, in fall 2000, and prior to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in Japan, Hamanaka discussed industry’s role in emission reductions. He pointed out that industries and the Keidanren, as the largest association of industries in Japan, are cautious about taking any further steps. “They seem reluctant to move forward and sign an agreement with government. They think that other things should be done first on a consumer level” (interview, Hamanaka 2000). Given that the Japanese economy has been suffering for many years and that the protocol’s entry into legal force has been uncertain, it makes sense not to implement costly measures. However, with Japan’s strong state and its close ties with industry, implementation of measures to achieve the country’s emission reductions by 2008 to 2012 seems feasible.

Civil Society

In contrast to industry, which has been aggressively working to deal with the issue of global climate change in Japan, civil society has paid much less attention to the issue and has been relatively external to the domestic climate change discussion. As mentioned, the industrial sector in Japan has an economic incentive to follow the issue of climate change and respond to the issue to avoid governmental regulation. For citizens, the situation is different: Makoto Ikenuchi, the managing director of the Hokkaido Seikatsu ("Lifestyle") Club, one of the largest consumer cooperatives in Japan, points out that "because the economy is bad, many people are not thinking about the environment. People are thinking about prices and money" (interview, 2000). When it comes to climate change, Japanese citizens do not appear to be particularly motivated to put pressure on the institutional structures of the state or the market to bring about environmental changes as they did in the 1970s to stop the pollution diseases.

In addition to the financial problems facing many Japanese citizens during the recession that began in the 1990s, the complexity of the issue of climate change also contributes to the lack of citizen activity. Surrounding the COP-3 negotiations in Kyoto, the Japanese media were deeply involved in covering the issue of climate change; the major newspapers in Japan covered the issue of climate change on an almost daily level (interview, Tanaka 2000). Although there was a good deal of media coverage of the issue in 1997, coverage has since dropped significantly. Given the conclusions of scholars such as Anderson (1997), who find that media coverage of environmental problems does not tell people what to think but rather what they should think about, public consciousness about the issue of climate change is presently quite low in Japan. In the words of Ayukawa, "People do not know about global warming so much any more" (interview, 1999).

Beyond the lack of media coverage and financial troubles, many of the people whom I interviewed pointed out that the complexity of the issue of climate change has limited the citizenry's understanding of the issue. Environmental experts such Kazuo Matsushita—an ex-member of the Environment Ministry who now serves as the acting vice president of one of the leading Japanese think tanks working on climate change, the government-funded IGES—states that "for the general public, I suppose it would be very difficult to understand the overall significance and importance of the climate change issue" (interview, 1999). Similarly, Hirata points out that "global climate change is very tough to understand, only about 10 percent of the people do" (interview, 2000). Writers for the newspapers themselves echo such opinions. In the words of Tanaka, "Japanese citizens cannot get all of the issues involved in global climate change" from reading the newspapers, since understanding the issue requires more depth

than the amount of space available in a newspaper can provide (interview, 2000). Although citizens are reported to have a low level of knowledge about global climate change, national policy making continues to move forward due to the strong relationship between the state, industry, and science.

Still another reason for the lack of citizen participation in the issue of climate change may be the structure of Japanese civil society itself. Many of the people whom I interviewed, including citizen activists, pointed out the weakness or lack of an active citizenry in Japan. In the words of Suda, "Citizens' involvement is not Japanese society's style" (interview, 1999). The weakness of the citizenry leads some, such as Ohta, to say that the "public always tries to find somebody to take care of them" (interview, 1999). Most people in Japan agree that the citizen activism against the pollution diseases of the 1970s no longer exists. "In Japan, [citizens] receive information from the government but not from the bottom-up. There are no protests now" (interview, Hirata 2000).

Although the public is not very engaged in the issue of climate change in Japan, a number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are working on the issue of climate change. Mie Asaoka, the president and founder of Kiko Network, points out that some of these organizations work specifically to "widen the public's consciousness" about the issue (interview, 1999). Other NGOs negotiate with the national government about Japan's international climate change position, provide input into national legislation regarding climate change, and work with industry. One of the NGOs most active in working with industry is the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). Japan. Ayukawa describes the WWF's work with industry: "Our future is to be working with industry; so we have this industry approach, and I am trying to gather a group of companies who are progressive or very interested and dedicated to the prevention of global warming" (interview, 1999). Even with this involvement in national issues and industry programs, many of the people whom I interviewed identified Japanese civil society as being relatively external to national politics in Japan. In her comments on the citizenry in Japan, Asaoka stated that "the citizenry is so weak. . . . It is not so much that the citizens' movement is very weak, but it is different" (interview, 1999).

Perhaps the most appropriate interpretation of the uniqueness of civil society in Japan is that it has an obvious spatial component. Members of the Seikatsu Club best describe it: "There is no *shimin undo* [national citizen's movement] in Japan, but there is a *jumini undo* [local people's movement]. Local movements exist, but there is not much on the national level" (interview, Demura 2000). Mie Asaoka of the Kiko Network builds on this idea: "Citizens are only active at the local level and they only have small involvement on the national level. The local level is where it can happen.

... NGO action is within a small community. They want it to be larger, but there is not much on a national level" (interview, Asaoka 1999). These statements by NGO leaders in Japan are consistent with some of the findings of Mitsuda in his research on environmentalism in Japan (1997; see also Mitsuda and Fisher 2000).

When discussing the specific character of civil society in Japan, many of the people whom I interviewed discussed the role that locally based lifestyle changes could take in mitigating climate change. One of the most well-known movement leaders in Japan, Harumi Suda, states that "the best way to change the system is through the community. Changing citizens' lifestyles could happen through community culture" (interview, 1999). In short, the results of my interviews with representatives of national environmental NGOs suggest the need to look at more locally based organizations involved in global climate change.

To gain a better understanding of the dynamics of civil society in Japan and its action with regard to climate change, I decided to follow the recommendations of a number of NGOs in Tokyo that mentioned a local project in Hokkaido, the northern island of Japan. The project was described by WWF, Japan, as "one big consumer group . . . saving electricity in their own group and . . . supporting a wind turbine in some other area" (interview, Ayukawa 1999). Begun as the response to a proposed nuclear power plant in Hokkaido, the Seikatsu Club cooperative created a project to decrease energy consumption and develop an alternative source of energy. The Seikatsu Club is now one of the largest cooperatives in Japan, with over 250,000 family memberships throughout the country. As the alternative electricity project gained support, it divested from the Seikatsu Club and is now called the Green Fund. Nonetheless, the fund continues to be run by members of the cooperative. "The fund charges its members for their electric bills plus an additional 5 percent of their bill, which is put in the 'Green Fund.' The fund then pays the electric companies for its members' electric bills. Any resident of Hokkaido can join this fund by paying an annual membership fee."¹² Once enough money is collected, it will be matched by a governmental subsidy to fund the construction of one windmill. Electricity generated from the six-megawatt windmill will go to the electricity company that distributes electricity in Hokkaido.

When I met with the members of the Seikatsu Club and the Green Fund to learn about their wind-energy project, I asked how the goals of their project are different from the various wind-energy parks being developed by the government on Hokkaido that are supported by MITI and jointly funded by the government (33 percent) and industry (66 percent). Most of the organization's members had little awareness about the government's plans; in fact, most of the members were visibly surprised by the growth of wind energy on Hokkaido. In response to a question about the

significance of their project, Ryuriko Demura, a member of the Seikatsu Club board of trustees and an organizer of the Green Fund, responded, "The Green Fund project is different from the government's because of where the money comes from" (interview, 2000). It is true that the government has windmill projects in which, in the words of a Hokkaido "New Energy" representative, "no citizen money is involved" (interview, Mizushima 2000). The Green Fund's project, in contrast, is motivated, developed, and funded by citizens. Instead of working with the government to promote wind energy in Hokkaido, these citizens have chosen to pursue their own separate program.

As of March 2001, enough money had been collected by the Green Fund to begin construction on the planned windmill. It is unlikely, however, that the windmill will become a major source of electricity for the citizens who supported it—its six megawatts will represent less than .00034 percent of Japan's 1998 electric demand (IEA 2000c).¹³ Still, the project does provide a positive example of an active, locally based civil society in Japan. Like many social movement organizations that are constrained by resources, the organizations involved in the windmill are focusing their attention on a project that is firmly external to the social complexes of the Japanese state and industry. It is unclear, however, if local citizen groups might have a larger effect on global climate change were they to work with, or between, the government and industry. Although changing consumer demand is only one method of reducing emissions—and a relatively slow one at that—lifestyle changes such as the ones begun by members of the Green Fund in Hokkaido could contribute to the domestic climate change regime in Japan.

CONCLUSION

The case of the Green Fund project in Hokkaido provides data for one of the main findings of this case study of Japan: the clear spatial component to civil society in Japan. Although there is not a strong Japanese civil society working on the national level to deal with a global issue such as climate change, there is a locally based civil society in Japan that is engaged in the issue of climate change external to other Japanese social actors. With this relatively minor exception, my interviews yield a striking consensus regarding the absence of citizens in the national debate and in playing a role in the mitigation of global climate change in Japan.

This conclusion is consistent with earlier research on Japan, reporting a "failure to achieve a civil society . . . related to the particularism of earlier village society" (Knight 1996, 239). In other words, the absence of a citizen presence in the national work on climate change and the strength of local

jumini-level movements is the result of the history of Japanese society itself. It was only after the disfiguring, pollution-related diseases struck people throughout the country that Japanese citizens demonstrated against industrial pollution. Since that time, the Japanese government has maintained a strong leadership position over many environmental issues, including global climate change, while collaborating with industry and keeping science central to the decision-making processes. In the words of Tanaka, "The government must communicate the point that climate change is very important. Industry must improve its materials and efficiency . . . and citizens must choose efficient products even if the products are more expensive" (interview, 2000).

In many ways, the case of Japan provides a clear example of a strong state that is able to collaborate. That the Japanese state is also collaborative provides a case of what Evans (1995) calls "embedded autonomy." In Japan, social actors have distinctive roles in the climate change regime. The citizens' role, however, is generally external to the policy-making process and predominantly local.

Although the history of Japanese government responses to environmental concerns is consistent with the theory of reflexive modernization, the present global climate change regime in Japan—with its strong state, collaborative market, and central role for science—comes closer to fitting the model of ecological modernization. Specifically, the Japanese climate change regime illustrates a top-down approach to dealing with the issue. In fact, some scholars have suggested that the theory may best describe Japan itself (e.g., Dryzek 1997; Giddens 1998).

Still, even though Japan's climate change regime may come close to fitting the outline of ecological modernization, there is one significant exception: proponents of ecological modernization theory expect social movement organizations to work with the state and industry to build new coalitions (e.g., Mol 2000a). To date, these new coalitions are not forming in Japan. Thus, the preliminary results of my Japanese research find actors from science, industry, and the state leading the way in making environmental protection possible without Japanese civil society playing an internal role in the policy and decision-making processes.

In other words, these data from Japan suggest flaws in the argument about how political possibility is created. This absence of an active civil society in Japan, at least at the national level, obviously challenges the theories that say there must be significant social movements and a strong civil society to have ecological modernization. One possible interpretation of the Japanese case is that the magnitude of past environmental mistakes created a political consensus around avoiding them in the future—a consensus that evidently extends even to the industries that are in a position to create or avoid such mistakes. Perhaps a more fitting interpretation is

that the particular configurations of social actors in Japan, like the international pressure mentioned earlier in this chapter, support the notion that the political outcomes surrounding the issue of climate change are dependent on the global environmental system.

At the first part of the COP-6 negotiations, advisors to the Japanese government such as Nishioka stated that the emission reduction target agreed upon by Japan in 1997 was a "huge mistake" (interview, 2000). He argued that Japan would not be able to meet its commitments without the protocol's inclusion of flexible mechanisms, such as carbon sinks. At the same time, however, Nishioka said that Japan was dedicated to the Kyoto Protocol. Even if there were a change in the U.S. position—which actually came to pass in March 2001—Nishioka argued that it "does not matter" to Japan's intention to ratify the treaty.

Two months after the U.S. position changed, the newly elected Japanese prime minister contradicted Nishioka's claim. During meetings with leaders in the United States and the European Union, and prior to the COP-6bis negotiations, Koizumi indicated that "Japan's ratification of the pact is linked to a change of heart by Washington" ("EU Won't Alter View on Kyoto" 2001). Given Japan's economic problems and the stated resolve of the new prime minister to solve those problems, it was unclear if Japan would continue to build a climate change regime in the face of recent developments. It was also unclear whether there would be changes in the roles of social actors involved in determining how Japan could meet its emission targets. All that was certain was that Japan had begun to develop an effective climate change regime during an economic recession and that final decisions regarding the future of the Kyoto Protocol would take place at the end of the COP-6 negotiations.

NOTES

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1. For the sake of simplicity, I am including Beck's work on the risk society (1999) and subpolitics (1997) within the literature on reflexive modernization. Although Beck has used differing terms to describe these theories, they are consistent in their main points.

2. The ISO 14,000 are the environmental standards of the international organization for standardization, which promote "the development and implementation of voluntary international standards, both for particular products and for environmental management issues" (www.epa.gov/owm/iso14001/isofaq.htm; accessed January 7, 2004).

3. Based on circulation rates for 1999, posted on www.business.vu.edu.au/pho22550/Top20Media/TopmediaAsia.htm#Japan (accessed October 1, 2003).
4. Even though the European Union has just about stabilized its emissions and was only .9 percent above 1990 levels in 1998, the EU has achieved this goal through a unionwide burden-sharing agreement that includes technology transfers to the former East Germany.
5. Although comparable data are only available through 1998, Japanese emissions are expected to have decreased even further since then.
6. At the same time, the actual role that scientists play in policy making can be problematic. One such example can be seen in the case of the pollution diseases, where scientists recognized the linkage between the pollution and the disease but their findings were covered up by the government.
7. Although the Environment Agency only became a ministry of the Japanese government in 2001, it is referred to as the Environment Ministry throughout this chapter, for simplicity.
8. It is important to note that, even before the Tokaimura accident, Japanese citizens were concerned about nuclear energy.
9. The United States Energy Information Administration reports that Japanese primary consumption totaled 21.75 quadrillion BTU in 1997 and 21.48 quadrillion BTU in 1998. In other words, there was a decline of 1.2 percent (EIA 1999, 178).
10. In fall 2001, Yasuko Kawashima changed her last name to Kameyama. For the sake of consistency, she is referred to as Kameyama throughout the chapter.
11. See www.keidanen.or.jp/english/policy/poll14/attachment1.html (accessed October 1, 2003).
12. See www.cnic.or.jp/english/topics/energy/renewable/%5B2%5Dwind-hydro.html (accessed October 1, 2003).
13. This calculation is based on 6,000 hours of operation per year.

5



Market Innovation with Consumer Demand in the Netherlands

Similar to the notion of *wa* in Japan, Dutch politics are known for their sense of collaboration. In turning to the Dutch case, it is important to note the easygoing character of the people and institutions within this postcolonial state. Acceptance and collaboration are central to the Dutch way of thinking, as can be seen by the Netherlands' rank as the first country to legalize euthanasia and as one of the only countries to legalize same-sex marriage. Even tourist guidebooks remark on the extent to which such flexible and consensual approaches characterize the practice of politics in the Netherlands (see, e.g., Colijn 1984; Catling 1995).

Beyond the more popular sources, academics have also written about these characteristics of the Dutch people. Perhaps Lijphart, in his seminal work on the "politics of accommodation" in the Netherlands, best describes Dutch politics:

Dutch politics is characterized by "mutually reinforcing," "superimposed," "congruent," and "parallel" rather than "crosscutting" affiliations and organizational patterns; class and religious cleavages separate self-contained "inclusive" groups with sharply defined "political subcultures"; and there is a multiparty system with considerable "interpenetration" within each sphere among parties, interest groups, and the communication media. But Dutch democracy is eminently stable and effective! (Lijphart 1975, 15)